History-dependent strategies are often used to support cooperation in repeated game models. Using the repeated common-pool resource assignment game and a perfect stranger experimental design, this paper reports novel evidence that players who have successfully used an efficiencyenhancing turn-taking strategy will teach other players in subsequent supergames to adopt this strategy. We find that subjects engage in turn taking frequently in both the Low Conflict and the High Conflict treatments. Prior experience with turn taking significantly increases turn taking in both treatments. Moreover, successful turn taking often involves fast learning, and individuals with turn taking experience are more likely to be teachers than inexperienced individuals. The comparative statics results show that teaching in such an environment also responds to incentives, since teaching is empirically more frequent in the Low Conflict treatment with higher benefits and lower costs.
Introduction
Repeated game models have been widely used by economists to study how repeated interaction may enhance cooperation. Like many equilibrium models of strategic interactions, however, equilibrium analysis of repeated games only shows that cooperation can be supported as equilibrium, but is silent about how such equilibrium may arise.
One usual justification of equilibrium analysis of strategic interaction is that if players play a game sufficiently often, then they may learn to adopt equilibrium play. The importance of learning in generating equilibrium play in games has been actively studied by scholars (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Camerer, 2003, chapter 6) . Furthermore, as suggested by some researchers (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, chapter 8; Camerer et al., 2002) , some sophisticated players may anticipate that others will learn from their experiences, and may incur short-term costs to teach others to learn to reach an equilibrium that improves their payoffs in the long run.
While teaching can potentially be important in affecting behavior in repeated games, only recently have researchers begun empirically investigating the role of teaching in repeated games.
Most of this small, emerging literature focuses on teaching and convergence, which studies how repetition affects the adoption of a particular Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game Hyndman et al., 2009 Hyndman et al., , 2011 .
1 These experimental studies provide evidence that teaching is important in the adoption of Nash equilibrium play. Most applications of repeated game models, however, consider how players can use history-dependent strategies to support cooperation (see, for example, Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for a recent survey). This raises the natural further question that needs to be studied in teaching and repeated games: If players have successfully used a history-dependent repeated game strategy to cooperate in a supergame, will they teach another player in a subsequent supergame to adopt this efficiencyenhancing repeated game strategy? An affirmative answer to this question will provide support for emphasizing such history-dependent strategies in economic applications of repeated game models in environments with ample teaching opportunities.
Using a simple 2x2 assignment game that has been influential in the study of conflict and coordination problems in the common-pool resources (CPR) literature (Ostrom et al., 1994) , this paper presents novel evidence that teaching is important in promoting the adoption of efficiencyenhancing history-dependent strategies. The evidence also suggests that teaching such strategies responds to incentives, since teaching is more frequent in the Low Conflict treatment than in the High Conflict treatment and teaching in the Low Conflict case has higher benefits and lower costs.
We choose to use the assignment game to study teaching of history-dependent strategies because "taking turns" is an efficient way to cooperate in this game, and turn taking is important in resolving conflict and coordination problems in the management of a wide variety of common-pool resources (Janssen and Ostrom, 2006) . In addition, the one-shot version of this game has a unique dominant strategy Nash equilibrium, which makes it easier to identify whether a player is incurring a short-term payoff cost to invest in actions that can plausibly be interpreted as teaching in the repeated game. Table 1 illustrates the (one-shot) CPR assignment game, which summarizes incentives for the following environment: Two fishermen independently decide to go to one of two fishing spots. The good spot has a value of h fish, and the bad spot has a value of l fish, where 0 h l > > .
If they choose different spots, each fisherman will obtain the respective value of the spot. If they choose the same spot, they will split the value of the spot. We shall focus on the case of 2 h l > , so that the good spot is much better than the bad spot.
In this game, the two asymmetric outcomes-(Tough, Soft) and (Soft, Tough)-maximize the sum of the players' payoffs, where Tough and Soft denote choosing Good Spot and Bad Spot, respectively. The players would like to coordinate on playing one of these two asymmetric outcomes. Conflict, however, is present in this game because a player prefers the asymmetric outcome in which she plays Tough to the other asymmetric outcome in which she plays Soft.
Furthermore, when h>2l, Tough is the dominant strategy for each player. Hence, (Tough, Tough) is the unique equilibrium in the one-shot assignment game.
One might expect, however, that if this game is played repeatedly, players may adopt a rotation scheme and take turns playing Tough. For example, Berkes (1992) reports that fishermen in Turkey employ a turn taking scheme to allocate fishing spots. A turn taking strategy is efficiency-enhancing, because it will enable the players to get an average payoff higher than the payoff in the unique Nash equilibrium (Tough, Tough) in the one-shot game. Lau and Mui (2010) show how turn taking behavior can be supported as an equilibrium in a class of games that includes the repeated assignment game.
Besides turn taking, however, another focal subgame perfect equilibrium of this repeated game is for each player to play the stage game dominant strategy Tough every period regardless of the past history. This is the benchmark case of non-cooperation, in which repetition does not enable the players to do any better than one-shot interactions.
While turn taking can ensure that the players will get the maximum total harvest of fish, h l + , when her opponent plays Tough in a particular period, a player who is supposed to take the "bad turn" may be tempted to play Tough as well to obtain the higher payoff of 0.5h instead of the low payoff of l . Such behavior, of course, is not conducive to turn taking. This suggests that, for a given amount of total resources ( h l + ) available in the community, larger differences between the attractiveness of the good and the bad spot increase difficulties in coordinating on turn taking. This implies that the ratio h/l-what we refer to as "the degree of conflict" in the discussion below in Section 2-can be important in affecting behavior in this environment.
We are interested in investigating whether subjects are willing to incur the short-term costs of playing the stage-game dominated strategy Soft, perhaps in alternation with Tough, to teach their opponents to adopt the efficiency-enhancing turn taking strategy. As we shall explain later, an increase in the degree of conflict increases the costs and lowers the benefits of teaching.
Our experiment therefore includes a Low Conflict treatment and a High Conflict treatment to evaluate how differences in the degree of conflict affect teaching. In the experiment, each subject plays the same indefinitely repeated assignment game seven times, but she plays with a different opponent in each supergame. This perfect stranger design allows subjects to teach new individuals across supergames, while eliminating the possibility that subjects will be playing a "repeated game of repeated games." We find that turn taking occurs frequently in both treatments, but is more common in the Low Conflict treatment. In both treatments, successful turn taking often involves fast learning, and individuals with turn taking experience are more likely to be teachers than inexperienced individuals. Furthermore, teaching occurs more frequently in the Low conflict treatment than in the High Conflict treatment. While a lower degree of conflict promotes turn taking when both members are inexperienced in turn taking, this difference disappears when members are experienced in turn taking. Our results suggest that once subjects learn about the efficiency-enhancing benefits of turn taking, experience is more important than the degree of conflict in explaining turn taking adoption
Our study focuses on teaching history-dependent repeated game strategies across different matches of supergames, and differs from the recent work of Terracol and Vaksmann (2009 ), and Hyndman et al. (2009 , 2011 , who focus on how finite repetition affects the adoption of a particular Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Hyndman et al. (2011) consider repeated play in two games with unique pure strategy Nash equilibria, and they observe some subjects teaching others to play the Nash equilibrium when they choose Nash equilibrium actions that are not best responses to their own reported beliefs. Terracol and Vaksmann (2009) and Hyndman et al.
(2009) also elicit beliefs from subjects, and both present evidence that subjects are teaching by not best responding to their own reported beliefs. Terracol and Vaksmann (2009) show that players are more likely to teach in the partner treatment (in which they are matched repeatedly with the same player) than in the random re-matching treatment. They also find that in their asymmetric game, the players who have more to gain from teaching others to play a preferred equilibrium are more likely to teach. Hyndman et al. (2009) consider repeated play of pure coordination game with two Pareto ranked pure-strategy equilibria. Their treatments manipulate the costs and benefits of teaching, and they find that teaching is more likely in their low costhigh benefit treatment.
2 2 Duersch et al. (2010) study how subjects learn to play against computers that are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. They find that teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation.
In these studies it is natural to use elicited beliefs to measure teaching, because either multiple equilibria exist in the stage games Hyndman et al., 2009 ), or there is no dominant strategy in the stage game (Hyndman et al. (2011) . The use of elicited beliefs raise some potential concerns, however, such as incentives for hedging among risk averse subjects and measurement noise because beliefs are deliberately not stronglyincentivized (see Hyndman et al. (2009) for thoughtful discussion regarding these issues).
Besides looking at the different questions of teaching history-dependent repeated game strategies, and teaching across different supergames as subjects gain experience, our study complements this earlier work by providing more direct evidence of teaching. Because the assignment game has a unique stage game dominant strategy equilibrium, subjects' choice of the non-dominant action is a clear indication that they are willing to incur short-run costs that can be interpreted as teaching. The data also show that subjects attempt to teach the other to take turns, since they often choose the Soft and Tough actions in an alternating sequence.
Unlike the contributions discussed above but like our paper, Camerer et al. (2002) consider teaching in repeated game strategies. Their main concern, however, is on teaching by a player who faces a sequence of different players in a repeated game. Their analysis shows that in the finitely repeated trust game in which a borrower faces a sequence of different lenders, the borrowers are willing to incur the cost (by refraining from defaulting) in earlier periods to induce lending by others in later periods.
Finally, other researchers have also documented turn taking behavior for various repeated games in the laboratory, ranging from the game of chicken (Bornstein et al., 1997) ; an entry game with incomplete information (Kaplan and Ruffle, 2007) ; to other 2x2 games with two efficient asymmetric outcomes (Prisbrey, 1992 , Bednar et al., 2010 . Recently, biologists Harcourt et al. (2010) present experimental evidence that pairs of stickleback fish use turn taking to solve coordination and conflict problems 3 None of these studies, however, focus on teaching. 
Experimental Design
To study whether learning and teaching are important in affecting the adoption of turn taking behavior in the repeated assignment game, we conducted 12 sessions at the University of Hong Kong, involving 192 human subjects. Subjects were students recruited through flyers and classroom announcements from the general student population, and each subject participated in only one session of this study. The majority (86%) of subjects had never participated in a previous economics experiment, and none participated in more than one session of this study.
As illustrated in Table 1 , the assignment game is completely described by the two parameters, h and l. Now consider an alternative specification of the assignment game by defining the following two parameters: h l λ = + and
The parameter h l λ = + is the total value (of fish) in the good and bad spots, which is the maximum surplus available to the two players when the players achieve the asymmetric outcome. The parameter / h l θ = is the ratio of the value of the good spot to the value of the bad spot, which reflects how the total surplus in an asymmetric efficient outcome is distributed, and can be interpreted as the degree of conflict of the game. Using the fact that 1 h θλ θ = + and 1 l λ θ = + , the assignment game can also be represented using the two parameters λ and θ , as illustrated in 
We conduct both the Low Conflict and the High Conflict treatments to evaluate how changes in the degree of conflict affect teaching. The games we implemented in the experiment are illustrated in the left and right columns of Table 3 , respectively. These are experimental "francs" that were converted to Hong Kong dollars at a pre-determined exchange rate. Note that the High Conflict assignment game is obtained from changing the value of θ -and only θ -from 7/3 in the Low Conflict assignment game to 6. 6 5 Note that for any probability p with which player 2 may play Tough, player 1 gets a higher payoff by playing Tough instead of Soft, and the difference in payoff between using these two different responses is given by
, which is increasing in θ . Hence, other things being equal, an increase in the degree of conflict increases the gain from playing Tough instead of Soft. 6 Thus, a change from the Low Conflict game to the High Conflict game can be thought as representing a change in the physical environment, where the total amount of fish available in the community remains unchanged, but some fish had migrated to the good spot. The laboratory allows us to test comparative statics results in a controlled environment where clean ceteris paribus counter-factual changes in the environment faced by the players may be hard to observe in the field. is her turn to "take the bad turn," and supporting the TTIR equilibrium requires a sufficiently high discount factor. The theoretical analysis in Lau and Mui (2010) implies that the required critical discount factors for the Low Conflict treatment and the High Conflict treatment are 1/7 and 2/3, respectively. In the experiment, each of the 7 groupings ("matches") in a session is a repeated game with random termination, using a 9/10 continuation probability. This continuation probability is chosen to ensure that it is larger than 1/7 and 2/3. The model in Lau and Mui 7 The TTIR strategy specifies that: (a) In the beginning period, the players will independently randomize between T and S (b) As long as the randomization yields the symmetric outcome of either ( ) , T T or ( ) , S S , the randomization phase will continue (c) Whenever randomization "succeeds" in getting the players to the asymmetric outcome of either ( ) , T S or ( ) , S T , the game will switch to the turn-taking phase in which each player chooses her opponent's action in the previous period. If no player defects from this strategy, the turn-taking phase will continue (d) Any defection by any player during the turn-taking phase will trigger a switch back to the randomization phase, and this randomization phase will continue until randomization succeeds in getting the players to one of the asymmetric outcomes (e) Once randomization succeeds in getting the players to either one of the two asymmetric outcomes, the players will again behave according to steps (c) and (d). Lau and Mui (2010) further show that the equilibrium probability of randomization in the "randomization phase" of the TTIR equilibrium-and hence the behavioral implications of the TTIR equilibrium-will not change if one considers alternative punishments against defection in the turn taking phase.
(2010) is an equilibrium model that identifies the condition under which turn taking can be supported as equilibrium behavior, but is not designed to study teaching. Therefore, we will not consider the quantitative predictions of their paper concerning the incidence of turn taking.
We chose the parameter values in Table 3 to give subjects an average payoff roughly equals 70 in both treatments, if successful turn taking is established. (It is only roughly equal, because the player who is supposed to take the good turn in the current period will have a higher intertemporal payoff.) On the other hand, the costs and benefits in deciding whether to cooperate differ in the two games. As illustrated in Table 3 , if a subject in the Low Conflict treatment expects that her opponent will play the dominant strategy Tough in the current period, by playing Soft instead of Tough, she is incurring a payoff loss equals 7 in the current period. On the other hand, a subject in the High Conflict treatment who expects that her opponent will play Tough incurs a higher payoff loss of 40 by playing Soft, which suggests that teaching is more costly in the High Conflict treatment.
8 Since the non-cooperative benchmark of repeating the stage game Nash equilibrium involves a higher payoff of 60 in the High Conflict treatment (which is higher than the Nash equilibrium payoff of 49 in the Low Conflict treatment), the relative gain from successful turn taking is also lower in the High Conflict treatment. These observations motivate our conjecture that teaching will be less likely in the High Conflict treatment.
9
A novel feature of our design is that the Low Conflict treatment and the High Conflict treatment were conducted simultaneously in a session. Because subjects play a repeated game 8 More generally, suppose that a subject in the High Conflict treatment has a belief H p that her opponent will play Tough, and a subject in the Low Conflict treatment has a belief L p . Then the difference in the cost of teaching for such two subjects will be (110 70 ) (77 70 )
. By design, this difference in teaching costs is constant at 33 if the two subjects hold the same belief H L p p = in both treatments. While differences in the treatments' degree of conflict might lead to differences in beliefs across treatments, so long as 33 / 70
, the subject in the High Conflict treatment will face a higher cost of teaching.
with random termination, the realized length of the repeated game can vary significantly across matches. Conducting the two treatments in the same session ensures that the realized lengths of the relevant supergames are identical across treatments. In the beginning of each session, the 16 participants were randomly assigned to one of two equal-sized "clusters", with 8 participants in each cluster. The instructions (available in the appendix) explained that participants in both clusters make decisions using exactly the same rules, except that participants in each cluster use an earnings table that differs from the earnings table used by participants in the other cluster.
Each session consists of 7 "groupings," and a participant in a cluster is randomly matched with every other participant in the same cluster once and only once (that is, perfect strangers matching). All this information is common knowledge to the participants.
The experiment was conducted in English. The instructions employed neutral terminology; for example, the two available actions in each stage game were simply labeled as a choice between X or Y, and their playing partner was described as "the other person you are grouped with" rather than "opponent" or "partner." All 16 participants were given the same set of instructions, and they learned the actual payoff table they would use throughout the experimental session when the instructions were completed. Subjects in one cluster did not know the payoff table used in the other cluster. At the conclusion of the instructions subjects completed a 5-question computerized quiz to ensure that they understood how to read their assigned payoff table and other aspects of the instructions. They received HK$3 for each correct answer on the quiz, and for any incorrect answer the subject's computer reviewed the correct answer by referencing the relevant part of the instructions. 10 The average number of correct quiz answers was 4.7, and 76 percent of subjects answered all 5 questions correctly. 10 The exchange rate was 7.8 HK$ ≈ 1 US$ when the experiment was conducted.
Each of the 7 groupings ("matches") in a session is a repeated game with random termination, using a 9/10 continuation probability. At the end of every period, subjects learned all actions and monetary payoffs for both persons in their grouping, and they recorded these choices and their own earnings on a hardcopy record sheet so they always had easy access to their complete history. The experimenter then rolled a ten-sided die in front of subjects to determine termination, and the match was terminated if and only if 0 was rolled. The instructions explained that re-grouping would stop after 7 matches, or if too little time remained in the session to initiate a new match. All matches in our experiment were terminated randomly according to the above procedure, and every session completed all 7 matches. (The final match of the first session had to be discarded, however, due to a software bug.) The match lengths varied from 1 period to 50 periods, with a mean of 10 periods and a median of 7 periods. A typical session lasted for 60 to 80 minutes. Earnings typically ranged between HK$76 to HK$156, with mean=HK$104.
Results
We first investigate how the degree of conflict and experience affect turn taking behavior in subsection 3.1. We then consider teaching and learning in subsection 3.2, and report findings regarding how subject characteristics affect teaching in subsection 3.3.
Turn Taking: The Degree of Conflict versus the Role of Experience
Result 1: Turn taking occurs more frequently in the Low Conflict treatment than in the High Conflict treatment.
Support:
We define a pair of subjects as engaging in taking turn in a match if they take turns for at least two consecutive periods and continue to alternate between X and Y. When participants accomplish turn taking, they very rarely "fall off" the turn taking path: Only 9 out of the 664 matches (1%) reached and then fell off a turn taking path. We find that turn taking occurs more frequently in the Low Conflict treatment than in the High Conflict treatment. In our experiment, 30% (99 out of 332) Low Conflict matches adopt turn taking. This rate falls by more than one-half to 14% (46 out of 332) in the High Conflict treatment. It is difficult for subjects to reach turn taking in very short supergame matches, so turn taking rates are greater for matches that are longer than four periods. For these longer matches, which are the ones summarized in Figure 1 , the turn taking rate is 40% (92 out of 232) for the Low Conflict treatment and again it falls by more than one-half to 19% (43 out of 232) in the High Conflict treatment. We present regression estimates that provide formal support of this result below. Clearly experience significantly increases turn taking, and Figure 2 suggests that experience could have more dominant effect than the differences in the degree of conflict. While a lower degree of conflict promotes turn taking when both members are inexperienced in turn taking, this difference disappears when members are experienced in turn taking.
In the logit regression shown in column (1) of Table 4 , the coefficients on the turn taking experience variables are both highly significant. When both members have turn taking experience the impact on the probability that the pair will engage in turn taking is greater than when only one member has turn taking experience, providing evidence that turn taking is especially likely if both have turn taking experience (likelihood ratio test p-value<0.01). The
High Conflict dummy variable is negatively significant while the "Period length of match"
variable is positive and significant, showing that turn taking is more likely for the Low Conflict treatment (Result 1) and for longer matches. This regression also includes 1/Match to allow for a nonlinear time trend across the session in the rate the pairs adopt turn taking, but this trend is never significant after accounting for experience and the degree of conflict.
Columns (2) and (3) report estimates separately for the cases in which no or one member of the pair has turn taking experience. (Insufficient variation exists in turn taking realizations for the case when both members have turn taking experience for reliable estimates.) The incidence of turn taking is significantly lower for the High Conflict game only when neither member has turn taking experience in their previous supergames. In summary, these results suggest that once subjects learn about the efficiency-enhancing benefits of turn taking, experience is more important for explaining turn taking adoption than the degree of conflict. They further imply that the persistent differences between the incidence of turn taking across the Low and High Conflict treatments in the late matches illustrated in Figure 1 occur because fewer subjects experienced successful turn taking in the earlier matches in the High Conflict treatment. 
Teaching and Learning
We now investigate the conjecture that teaching is more likely in the Low Conflict treatment discussed above. Since Tough is the stage game dominant strategy in the assignment game, a participant's choice to play Soft, or Soft alternating with Touch, provides a relatively clear indication that she is trying to teach the other pair member to adopt the efficiencyenhancing turn taking strategy. This requires the teacher to play a stage game dominated strategy, so teaching is costly before reaching the turn taking path. We therefore define the teacher as the pair member who has lower profits in the periods preceding the (successful) turn-taking phase, and a learner as the pair member who has higher profits in the periods preceding the turn-taking phase. As discussed below, the classification of the teacher is virtually identical when using an alternative definition of the teacher as the subject who first plays Soft. While there are several "patterns" in reaching the turn-taking path, two stylized patterns-"fast learning" and "slow learning"-appear in the data. also shows that the difference in cumulative payoff between the teacher and the learner is much larger for this slow learner example than the difference shown in Figure 3 for the "fast" learning episode.
Result 3: Successful turn taking often involves fast learning.
Support:
The slow learning in Figure 4 represents the exception rather than the rule. The modal teaching episode is short: The teacher chooses Soft in the first period, and the learner gets the hint and chooses Soft in the second period. Overall, the median number periods required to reach the turn taking path was 3, with the average number of periods equal to 4.2. Figure 5 shows that the average number of periods required to reach the turn taking path declines with player turn taking experience. Even when no member has turn taking experience, nearly half of the pairs who reach the turn taking path do so within three periods. Over 80 percent of pairs who adopt turn taking when only one pair member has experience do so within five periods. 
Using the earlier definition of the teacher as the pair member who has lower profits in the periods preceding the turn-taking phase, in 6 of the 145 turn taking episodes both players have equal pre-turn taking profits, so the teacher there is undefined/ambiguous. 11 Exactly one of the two pair members has previous turn taking experience in 41 of the 139 turn taking episodes in which the teacher is identifiable. The pair member who is experienced in turn taking is the teacher in 28 of these cases (68%).
11 The alternative classification mentioned above that provides similar results-defining a teacher as the pair member who first plays Soft-gives more ambiguous cases (25 rather than 6 ambiguous matches). Importantly, these two definitions classify the exact same individual as the teacher in all but one turn taking episode when a teacher is identified. Figure 6 illustrates how teaching and turn taking "spreads" through the population of subjects, displaying the frequencies that subjects who have different experience chose the Soft action across periods of a match for the High Conflict treatment. The low line marked with triangles indicates the low rate of Soft when neither pair member has turn taking experience, consistent with the low rate of turn taking for these cases (cf. Figure 2) . For the cases when only one member of a pair has turn taking experience, the experienced subject chooses Soft at a much higher rate in the early periods, indicated by the line marked with diamonds. The pair member without experience, marked with squares, does not choose Soft more frequently than the low rate chosen in completely inexperienced pairs during the initial periods. By period 4, however, even in these aggregate data a turn taking pattern begins to emerge, apparently in response to the Soft action choices by the experienced pair member. The experienced and inexperienced pair members' average Soft rates begin to alternate in a turn taking pattern for the remaining periods.
Subjects in pairs where both members have turn taking experience choose Soft at rates that converge to one-half, reflecting those pairs' uniform adoption of turn taking. Similar patterns emerge for the aggregate data in the Low Conflict treatment, although the alternating pattern in the matches with one experienced member is less pronounced. Table 5 presents random effects logit models of subjects' choice of the Soft action for each of the first 15 periods of a match to document this emergence of turn taking across subjects.
The leftmost column shows that subjects who had turn taking experience are more likely to choose Soft in the first period, but of course their propensity to play Soft in the first period is unaffected if only the other subject has turn taking experience. Subjects in pairs where both members have turn taking experience are more likely to choose Soft than the omitted case of no turn taking experience throughout all periods. When a subject has experience but the other player does not, he chooses Soft at a consistently higher rate throughout all the early periods of the match. By the fourth period, this has its first statistically significant influence on the inexperienced player, increasing her likelihood of choosing Soft. This evidence is consistent with the fast learning described above. After the seventh period of the match, the estimates indicate a pattern where the experienced pair member is more likely to choose Soft in the odd periods, and the (previously) inexperienced pair member chooses Soft in the even periods. This reflects the alternating pattern often established by the experienced and teaching player, through choosing Soft in periods 1, 3, and so on. This often leads the inexperienced, learning player to choose Soft in periods 2, 4, and so on. The kind of slow learning depicted in the example shown in Figure 4 raises the possibility that "playing dumb," that is, pretending to be a slow learner, is actually a smart strategy. It could be considered as a best response to an opponent who engages in persistent teaching, so it is natural to ask whether such "sophisticated dumb" play is observed more frequently in later periods among subjects who may understand the benefits of turn taking and think others may try to teach them to take turns. The evidence, however, suggests that such sophisticated exploitation of the teachers is not widely used. First, as already documented the delay before turn taking begins is very short when subjects have turn taking experience. Second, among pairings that lasted longer than four periods but failed to result in turn taking, there were 120 cases where only one member has turn taking experience. There does not seem to be evidence that the experienced member of the pair tried to play dumb, because this experienced member chose Soft at least once in 110 out of these 120 cases (92%). The data thus indicate that the experienced subject tries to teach, rather than play dumb.
To provide further statistical support for Result 4, Table 6 presents evidence regarding the type of agent who tends to play the teaching role for successful turn taking matches, or who attempts to initiate turn taking for unsuccessful matches. Column (a) shows that subjects who have successful turn taking experience are more likely to be classified as the teacher in the successful matches. Column (b) provides an indication of the types of subjects who attempt to initiate turn taking by examining the factors influencing the propensity to play Soft in pairings that do not adopt turn taking. Subjects are more likely to play Soft, a necessary step to initiate turn taking, when they have previous turn taking experience and in the Low Conflict treatment.
Result 5: Teaching attempts occur more frequently in the Low Conflict treatment than the High Conflict treatment among pairs who fail to adopt turn taking. For teaching to be profitable relative to the Nash equilibrium (Tough, Tough), based on realized payoffs the likelihood of successful teaching must be over ten times greater in the High Conflict compared to the Low Conflict treatment. Notes: Models estimated with subject random effects. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the one-percent level; * denotes significance at the five-percent level (all two-tailed tests).
Column (b) of Table 6 already documents the greater likelihood of choosing Soft in the Low Conflict game for pairs who do not adopt turn taking. While choosing Soft in any period is a simple indication of teaching, in order to identify which subject should be considered the teacher of the pair in matches that fail to adopt turn taking, we need to account for which subject first chooses Soft. We also need to define what matches constitute unsuccessful teaching. We consider that unsuccessful teaching occurs in a match when (a) we do not observe turn taking, (b) one subject of the pair chooses Soft earlier than the other subject, and (c) the match lasts for more than four periods. Criterion (c) is included because satisfying the definition of turn taking is difficult in matches that terminated quickly. A total of 201 matches were classified as unsuccessful teaching by this definition. 12 The teacher is the subject who first chooses Soft, and the learner is the other subject. Table 7 reports the realized per-period payoffs for the entire match, separately for the successful and unsuccessful turn taking matches and for teachers and learners. First, note that on average, teachers earn 4 to 5 experimental francs less per period than learners in the successful turn taking matches, but they earn 12 to 15 experimental francs less per period than learners in the unsuccessful turn taking matches. Useful benchmarks for evaluating the expected profitability of teaching are shown in the far left column, based on repeated play of the one-shot Nash equilibrium. Clearly teaching pays off when it is successful, but not when it is unsuccessful. In the Low Conflict treatment, as indicated on the far right column teaching must only be successful 4.3 percent of the time for it to generate expected profits that exceed the 12 Alternatively, we could use a more stringent definition to classify a teacher as a subject who alternates between Soft and Tough. For example, we considered the definition of teaching for the unsuccessful turn taking matches to be at least one pattern of Soft-Tough-Soft by the teacher. We only observed 74 matches that could be classified as unsuccessful teaching by this definition, however. Conclusions regarding the relative costs of teaching in the two games are qualitatively similar, so to conserve space we only report the version based on the first choice of Soft.
(Tough, Tough) equilibrium benchmark of 49. 13 In contrast, in the High Conflict treatment teaching must be successful more than half of the time for it to generate higher expected payoffs than 60, the payoff from repeated play of the one-shot Nash equilibrium of (Tough, Tough). 
Teaching, Turn Taking and Subject Characteristics
Our final result concerns the socio-demographic characteristics of teachers and turn takers. Previous studies have identified substantial differences in economic behavior and preferences between women and men (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Croson and Gneezy, 2009 ), for example, as well as between economics majors and non-majors (e.g., Frank et al., 1993; Faravelli, 2007) . One important systematic difference concerns preferences for risk between men and women, with women less willing to incur risks in a variety of contexts. This could be relevant for this game because teaching is risky.
Result 6: Women tend to earn more than men, and women are more likely to be learners rather than teachers when turn taking occurs. (two-tailed p-value=0.062) . The data provide no evidence, however, that this payoff advantage for women is due to participation in more turn taking matches. The data instead suggest that this is driven by the fact that women are more likely to be the learner than the teacher.
The teacher is a male in 95 out of the 139 matches (68%) that reach the turn taking phase and have a well-defined teacher. This rate is higher than the overall fraction of males in the experiment (which was 108 out of 192 subjects, 56%). Of the 75 cases in which there is one male and one female in the pair and the pair experienced turn-taking, the male is the teacher in 50 of the cases (67%) and the female is the teacher in 25 of the cases. This difference is not due to more turn taking experience among males, since at the start of matches with successful turn taking the genders had virtually identical rates of successful turn taking histories.
The logit regression reported in column (a) of Table 6 shows that male subjects are significantly more likely to be a teacher for those match pairs that engage in turn taking. The regression in column (b) indicates that male subjects are also more likely to choose Soft for those pairings that fail to reach turn taking. Interestingly, these regressions also reveal that Economics/Finance majors are less likely to be involved in turn taking, which is consistent with some earlier findings that econ majors tend to be less cooperative than non-economics majors.
Subjects with higher grades, and who scored better on the instructions comprehension quiz, are more likely to choose Soft in the "failure" pairings of column (b).
Concluding Remarks
History-dependent strategies are often used to support cooperation in repeated game models. An emerging literature has suggested that teaching can be important in affecting the adoption of equilibrium behavior, but to our knowledge, there is no study that empirically assesses whether teaching is important in the adoption of efficiency-enhancing history-dependent strategies. Using the repeated assignment game and a perfect stranger design, this paper reports novel evidence that teaching is important in affecting the adoption of efficiency-enhancing history-dependent strategies in supergames. The comparative statics results show that teaching in such an environment also responds to incentives, since teaching is more frequent in the Low
Conflict treatment with higher benefits and lower costs. We also find that successful turn taking often involves fast learning, and individuals with turn taking experience are more likely to be teachers than inexperienced individuals. Furthermore, teaching attempts occur more frequently in the Low Conflict treatment among pairs who fail to adopt turn taking.
This paper is the first to explore the importance of teaching on the adoption of efficiencyenhancing history-dependent strategies. Obviously, additional studies are necessary to provide a better understanding of how teaching affects the adoption of such repeated game strategies in different environments. For example, our current study holds the continuation probability constant across treatments to focus on the effect of the degree of conflict on teaching behavior. In most applications of repeated games models, however, the continuation probability is a key parameter in determining whether cooperative behavior can be supported as an equilibrium.
Hence, it is natural to ask to what extent that changes in the continuation probability may affect teaching behavior in indefinitely repeated games. For example, in the assignment game considered in this study, with 2 h l > so that Tough is the dominant strategy in the stage game, a player has the incentive to deviate from turn taking when it is his turn to play Soft, so supporting turn taking as equilibrium behavior in the repeated game in this case requires that the continuation probability be larger than ( )
On the other hand, when 2 h l < , both of the joint-payoff maximizing asymmetric outcomes are Nash equilibria in the assignment game, and players who are supposed to take the "bad turn" do not have the incentive to defect at any period during the turn taking phase. This is also true for familiar games such as the Battle of the Sexes and Chicken. In such cases, turn taking can be supported as equilibrium for any continuation probability (Lau and Mui, 2010) . These observations suggest the conjecture that when the good spot is much better than the bad spot in the assignment game, a change in the continuation probability (from one above the critical continuation probability to one below this critical value)
can have significant effect on teaching behavior, while a similar change in the continuation probability will have negligible effect on teaching behavior if the two spots provide more similar payoffs. We leave the experimental evaluation of this conjecture for future research.
Appendix (not intended for publication) Instructions
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. The Research Grant Council of Hong Kong has provided funds for this research. If you follow the instructions and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. The currency used in the experiment is called "francs." Your francs will be converted to Hong Kong Dollars at a rate of 60 francs to one dollar. At the end of today's session, you will be paid in private and in cash.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people's work. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
Please pay careful attention during these instructions. When the instructions are completed, you will take a short quiz on your computer to verify your understanding. You will be able to refer back to the instructions as you answer the quiz questions. The computer will record how many quiz questions you answer correctly, and you will be paid $3 for correct answer(s) to each question.
The experiment consists of many separate decision making periods. At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly grouped with another participant to form a two-person group. You will be grouped with this same participant for a random number of periods, as explained later. Although you will be grouped with someone in this room, you will never learn the identity of the person in your group.
Your Choice
During each period, you and the other person you are grouped with will make one choice, X or Y.
You and the other person make this choice simultaneously; that is, you do not learn the choice of the other person until after you make your choice, and vice versa. Both you and the other person may choose either
The computer program will display on the decision screen the earning The End of the Period After everyone has made choices for the current period you will be automatically switched to the outcome screen, as shown below. This screen displays your choice as well as the choice of the other person in your group. It also shows your earnings for this period and your cumulative earnings for this grouping so far.
Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your choice and the choice of the other person in your group on your Personal Record Sheet. Also record your current and cumulative earnings for this grouping. Click on the OK button on the lower right of your screen when the experimenter instructs you.
The Random Ending to Each Grouping
At the beginning of the experiment, the computer will randomly match you with another participant to form a two person group. You will remain grouped with the same person in your two-person group for some random number of periods. At the end of each decision period, we will throw a ten-sided die on the floor in front of some of the participants. The outcome of the roll will be announced verbally to everyone. If the die comes up 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9, then you will remain grouped with the same participant for another period; at the end of the next period, the die will be thrown again, and again the grouping will continue for at least another round if a 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9, is thrown.
If the die comes up a 0 on any throw, then the current grouping is immediately terminated. The experiment will also be terminated at that time if one of the following conditions hold: (1) the total number of periods conducted in the experiment at that point exceeds 120 or (2) if you have already been grouped with seven different persons to form seven different twoperson groups at that point, or (3) if less than 30 minutes remain in the two-hour block of time reserved for this lab session. Otherwise, you will be randomly re-grouped with another different participant to form a new two-person group. You will remain grouped with this same person for some random number of periods, with the same die-throwing rule to determine the termination of each random re-grouping of participants. Furthermore, the random grouping performed by the computer will ensure that if you have been grouped with another participant to form a twoperson group before, then you will never be grouped with this same participant in this experiment again. Remember that you will never learn the actual identity of the individuals you are grouped with.
That is, if John is grouped with Rachel in the first grouping, John will remain grouped with Rachel for some random number of periods. When the grouping is terminated because the die comes up a 0 on a particular throw, the grouping is terminated. John will be re-grouped with another person other than Rachel, and will remain grouped with this new person for some random number of periods, and John will never be grouped with Rachel again for the rest of the experiment. Note that rule (2) above implies that in this experiment, you will at most be grouped with seven different participants to form different two-person groups.
Earning Tables and Exchange Rate At the beginning of the experiment and before any two-person groups are formed, the 16 participants of today's experiment will be randomly divided into two equal-sized clusters, with 8 participants in each cluster. Participants in both clusters will be making decisions using exactly the same rules as explained above, except that participants in each cluster will be using an earning table that differs from the earning table used by participants in the other cluster. If a participant is randomly assigned to one of these two clusters in the beginning of the experiment, he/she remains in the same cluster for the whole experiment and he/she will only be matched with participants in the same cluster to form a two-person group. This means that you will be using the same earning Before we begin the experiment you will take a short quiz on your computer to verify your understanding of these instructions. Please feel free to refer back to the instructions as you answer the quiz questions. The computer will record how many quiz questions you answer correctly, and you will be paid $3 for correct answer(s) to each question. Also feel free to raise your hand to summon an experimenter if you do not understand the explanation for a wrong answer. Please do not say anything before the experimenter comes to you, as the experimenter will answer your question in private.
The earning table in Figure 1 above provides an example regarding how the choice of you and the other person determine the earnings of each person. When we start the quiz, the actual earning table that indicates how your choice and the choice of that person you are grouped with determine the earnings of each person will be displayed. This is the earning table that you will be using throughout the whole experiment. Please record the information on your Record for the Earning Table. 
